"The 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review has
radically changed the Carrier Strike concept. It generated £3.4
billion of savings but introduced significant levels of
operational, technical, cost and schedule uncertainty. It will take
two years for the Department to reach a mature understanding of the
consequences of the decision. These consequences include a decade
without an operational carrier and the risks after such a time
associated with reconstituting the capability.
"The risks to the delivery of the new carriers are
compounded by more generic problems with defence acquisition –
notably the MoD’s continuing difficulties in balancing its
budget."
Michael Whitehouse, Chief Operating Officer, 7 July
2011
The National Audit Office has expressed deep
concern about risks to value for money from the changes to the
aircraft carrier and associated Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) aircraft
project made in the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review
(SDSR).
The SDSR decision, in October 2010, was for
the MOD to build two carriers but operate only one, pending the
next SDSR. This ship will be converted, using catapults and
arrestor gear, to fly a different, more capable, version of the JSF
to the one previously planned. This carrier will be available
at sea only for an average of 150-200 days each year and fewer of
the carrier version of the aircraft will operate from the carrier
initially, reducing the number of possible daily sorties by more
than two-thirds. A decision whether to convert the other carrier
will be taken in the next SDSR, planned for 2015.
The decision to fit catapults and arrestor
gear to the carrier means that the introduction of Carrier Strike
will be delayed by two years, to 2020. Given the decision to
retire the Harrier aircraft and the existing aircraft carrier
immediately, there will be a decade-long gap without aircraft
carrier capability. The changes will save some £3.4 billion over
ten years.
Today’s report highlights the complex
inter-relationship between the various cost, short-term
affordability, military and industrial factors involved in the
Carrier Strike decision. From the papers it saw, the National Audit
Office could not understand how those factors were brought together
to enable the MOD to reach a judgement on value for
money.
The NAO identifies two principal risks to
value for money on Carrier Strike. First, the SDSR is unaffordable
unless there is a real terms increase in defence funding from 2015
onwards. The National Audit Office is worried that the
continuing difficulties the MoD is facing in balancing its budget
leaves Carrier Strike vulnerable to further change.
Secondly, the SDSR decision has introduced
more technical, cost and schedule uncertainty. Thinking on the way
the carriers will be used in operation is still evolving; and there
are major risks reconstituting Carrier Strike capability after a
decade without it.
Publication details:
HC: 1092, 2010-2012
ISBN: 9780102969771