Press Release - The 2001 Outbreak of Foot and Mouth
Disease
21 June 2002
A National Audit Office report to Parliament today on the
handling of the 2001 foot and mouth outbreak showed that the
outbreak cost the public sector over £3 billion and the private
sector more than £5 billion.
According to head of the NAO Sir John Bourn, lessons to be
learned from the outbreak, unprecedented in its nature and scale,
included the need for more thorough contingency planning, more
sensitive to outbreaks of different scales, which would allow
better preparedness for a future outbreak. In addition, in the
event of a crisis, plans should be made to ensure that cost and
financial control should not fall below a minimum standard.
Preparations for a possible outbreak of foot and mouth
disease
The Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (now the
Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs) had prepared
contingency plans that met European Union requirements. These plans
worked in those areas where there were relatively few cases.
However, the unprecedented scale of the outbreak meant that in many
areas the resources needed to deal with the disease rapidly went
beyond what had been envisaged in contingency plans.
According to today’s report, it is unrealistic to expect that
any contingency plan could have coped with all the problems and
difficulties that arose or that the Department could have forecast
the nature of the 2001 outbreak. In the light of Britain’s
experiences many countries are revising their contingency plans.
Nevertheless there are lessons to be learned in preparing
contingency plans for the future.
- The contingency plans were based on the most likely scenario
and other scenarios were not considered. In line with European
Commission guidance, the Department’s plans were based on the
supposition that there would not be more than ten infected premises
at any one time. (In this outbreak there were at least 57 infected
premises before initial diagnosis.)
- Little prior consideration had been given to the impact on
non-farming businesses that a large-scale epidemic might have. For
example, the initial blanket closure of most footpaths by local
authorities had a very severe effect on the rural tourist
industry.
- An internal report in 1999 found considerable variations in the
State Veterinary Service’s readiness to deal with outbreaks of
exotic notifiable diseases, including foot and mouth. By July 2000
the Department had made progress on many action areas but
implementation of other key issues was delayed by the need to
attend to other high priority work.
- Tackling a serious outbreak of animal disease requires
effective co-operation with other government departments and
agencies and those affected. These stakeholders were not formally
consulted in preparing contingency plans, although some had been
involved in simulation exercises as part of local contingency
planning.
The report recognises that the Department has prepared an
Interim Operational Contingency Plan which codifies lessons learned
during the 2001 outbreak, which will be reviewed once the findings
of the independent inquiries have been published.
Handling the outbreak
Foot and mouth disease was eradicated in two months or less in
around half the infected areas. The Department successfully
contained the outbreak substantially to those areas initially
infected with the disease and was also successful in ensuring that
once the disease had been stamped out in an area it did not
reappear. The disease was eradicated in seven months, the same time
that it took to deal with the smaller and more localised outbreak
in 1967-68. The report notes the commitment and dedication of the
Department’s staff and that those involved worked punishingly long
days in stressful and often distressing conditions.
Because of the widespread ‘seeding’ of the virus before it was
discovered (48 premises in 15 counties had already been seeded
before 19 February 2001 when disease was first suspected) there
were severe problems in handling the outbreak in the worst-hit
areas.
- It took time to get other agencies involved. The Department
liaised with the armed services and other Government Departments
and agencies from the outset but decided not to call for
substantial military assistance for three weeks. This was because
the Government considered that the early stages of the epidemic
presented no obvious requirement for military participation.
- Vets played a key role but in the early weeks there were too
few of them and this delayed disease control. The Chief Veterinary
Officer called on agreed standby arrangements nationally and
internationally from 23 February 2001. By mid-April 2001 the
Department had the number of vets it felt were needed to contain
the outbreak.
- A national movement ban (on 23 February 2001) prevented greater
spread of the disease but with hindsight should have been imposed
earlier in this outbreak. A national ban would have been
unprecedented and the Department considered that the
epidemiological evidence at the time did not exist to justify
it.
- Communications and information systems were severely stretched
during the epidemic. The Department found it difficult in the
crisis conditions to get its key instructions and messages across
and to obtain good quality information from the field.
Controlling the costs of the outbreak
Farmers received over £1.1 billion in compensation for animals
that were slaughtered for disease control purposes and over £200
million for animals slaughtered for welfare reasons. Many farmers
and rural business suffered consequential losses to which they were
not entitled to compensation. The Government introduced a series of
measures to alleviate the financial difficulties of small
businesses.
The sheer volume of cases put compensation schemes under
enormous pressure and this led to costs being higher than they
might otherwise have been in more normal circumstances.
- The professional valuers who determined compensation tended to
make higher valuations as more and more animals were slaughtered
because they expected increased prices for stock when the markets
reopened. Standard rates for slaughtered animals were introduced on
22 March 2001 because the valuation process was thought to be
delaying the slaughter of animals on infected premises. The
standard rates acted as a floor for valuations and contributed to a
rise in the compensation paid.
- The Department introduced the livestock welfare disposal scheme
to alleviate the suffering of animals who were not directly
affected by foot and mouth disease but who could not be moved
because of movement restrictions. The rates were extremely
attractive to farmers and the volume of applications overwhelmed
the Rural Payments Agency, who administered the scheme.
The total bill for measures to deal with the epidemic is
expected to reach nearly £1.3 billion by the time all claims are
settled. The largest items are £375 million for haulage and
disposal – including £113 million on mass burial pits - and £304
million on cleansing and disinfecting. Large numbers of staff had
to be brought together quickly and deployed across the country and
a wide range of goods and services procured to meet urgent demands.
Consequently systems of cost and financial control were put under
great strain:
- The Department recognised that it might have to pay a premium
to get things done at maximum possible speed. Valuers, slaughterers
and private vets, without whom the disease could not have been
eradicated, all demanded and received higher fee rates.
- Many contracts, which would normally be put out to tender, were
awarded without competition. Aspects of some contracts were
initially agreed orally. When some contracts came to be written and
formalised it was sometimes difficult for the parties involved to
recall the detail of what had been agreed. This later gave rise to
many disputes about payment for work done.
- Information was often lacking to support the payment of bills.
The Department was frequently unable to monitor the work being
carried out by contractors, especially the slaughter and disposal
of animals, and the cleansing and disinfection of farms.
After the difficulties experienced in the early weeks, the
Department took action to control the costs of the outbreak. This
included setting up a dedicated financial unit and reorganising
financial responsibilities. Forensic accountants have also been
employed to examine the invoices of the largest contractors.
Sir John Bourn said today:
"This outbreak had a devastating effect on the rural
economy and parts of the tourist industry. We must acknowledge that
it was of an unprecedented nature and magnitude. In the light of
what happened, urgent action is needed to produce contingency plans
which would be more sensitive to outbreaks of different scales and
thus be better suited to dealing with a future crisis on this
scale. Moreover, further research must be carried out into
effective measures for tackling foot and mouth. And the means for
ensuring minimum standards of cost and financial control in crisis
conditions must be established.
"There are lessons to be learned for the whole of
government from the foot and mouth crisis. Departments need to be
aware of the major threats in their areas of business and to have
contingency plans in place which conform with best practice on risk
management."
Notes for Editors
- Foot and mouth disease was confirmed at an abattoir in Essex on
20 February 2001. By the time the disease had been eradicated in
September 2001, more than 6 million animals had been slaughtered:
over 4 million for disease control purposes; and over 2 million for
welfare reasons. The Treasury has estimated that the net economic
effect of the outbreak was less than 0.2% of gross domestic product
(less than £2 billion) because expenditure was diverted elsewhere
in the economy.
- Press notices and reports are available from the date of
publication on the NAO website at http://www.nao.org.uk/ Hard copies can
be obtained from The Stationery Office on 0845 702 3474.
- The Comptroller and Auditor General, Sir John Bourn, is the
head of the National Audit Office employing some 750 staff. He and
the NAO are totally independent of Government. He certifies the
accounts of all Government departments and a wide range of other
public sector bodies; and he has statutory authority to report to
Parliament on the economy, efficiency and effectiveness with which
departments and other bodies have used their resources.
Press Noticen 47/02
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