Projects leaving the Government Major Projects Portfolio
This report examines projects leaving the Government Major Projects Portfolio, which comprises the biggest and riskiest projects across government
This report examines projects leaving the Government Major Projects Portfolio, which comprises the biggest and riskiest projects across government
This investigation is about acquiring land and property for Phase One (London to the West Midlands) of the High Speed 2 programme
This investigation is about acquiring land and property for Phase One (London to the West Midlands) of the High Speed 2 programme
On 15 January 2018, Carillion declared insolvency and the Official Receiver, an employee of the Insolvency Service, started to liquidate its assets and contracts. This report focuses on the role of the UK government in preparing for and managing the liquidation of Carillion.
On 15 January 2018, Carillion declared insolvency and the Official Receiver, an employee of the Insolvency Service, started to liquidate its assets and contracts. This report focuses on the role of the UK government in preparing for and managing the liquidation of Carillion.
This investigation sets out the decision-making process, leading to the July 2017 announcement of the cancellation of three rail electrification projects: the Midland Main Line north of Kettering (to Nottingham and Sheffield); the Great Western Main Line between Cardiff and Swansea; and the Lakes Line between Oxenholme and Windermere.
This investigation sets out the decision-making process, leading to the July 2017 announcement of the cancellation of three rail electrification projects: the Midland Main Line north of Kettering (to Nottingham and Sheffield); the Great Western Main Line between Cardiff and Swansea; and the Lakes Line between Oxenholme and Windermere.
The NAO is publishing a suite of short guides for the new Parliament, one for each government department and a selection of cross-government issues, to assist House of Commons select committees and members of Parliament.
This examines the causes of poor performance on the Thameslink, Southern and Great Northern network since the franchise began in September 2014, the effects on passenger services, financial outcomes for the operator and the Department, and the Department’s handling of the Thameslink, Southern and Great Northern franchise.
This examines the causes of poor performance on the Thameslink, Southern and Great Northern network since the franchise began in September 2014, the effects on passenger services, financial outcomes for the operator and the Department, and the Department’s handling of the Thameslink, Southern and Great Northern franchise.