Report

by the Comptroller
and Auditor General

Cross-government

The effectiveness of Official Development Assistance expenditure

HC 2218 Session 2017–2019 20 June 2019

Our vision is to help the nation spend wisely.

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Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General

Ordered by the House of Commons
to be printed on 19 June 2019

This report has been prepared under Section 6 of the National Audit Act 1983 for presentation to the House of Commons in accordance with Section 9 of the Act

Gareth Davies
Comptroller and Auditor General
National Audit Office

17 June 2019

We have, to date, produced three reports on Official Development Assistance (ODA). This report builds on our previous work to consider the effectiveness of ODA expenditure.

© National Audit Office 2019

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006453 06/19 NAO

The National Audit Office study team consisted of:
Terry Caulfield, Anthony Pitt, Emma Wilding and Stephanie Woodrow, under the direction of Keith Davis.

This report can be found on the
National Audit Office website at
www.nao.org.uk

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Key facts

Summary

1 In 2010, the coalition government committed to spending 0.7% of UK gross national income on overseas aid – known as Official Development Assistance (ODA) – from 2013 onwards. This is the proportion of a nation’s income that the United Nations has said developed countries should aim to spend on overseas aid. The UK has met the 0.7% target each year from 2013 to 2017. In 2015 this commitment became legally binding. The increase in the UK’s gross national income and the UK’s commitment to the 0.7% target has led to an increase in total UK ODA expenditure.

2 The Department for International Development (DFID) has always spent the majority of the UK’s ODA expenditure. But the proportion of total ODA it spends has decreased from 89% in 2013 to 81% in 2015 to 72% in 2017.1 DFID’s ODA expenditure is at the same level in 2017 as in 2013 – just over £10 billion.2 ODA spending by other government departments (such as the Foreign & Commonwealth Office and the Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy), by cross-government funds (such as the Conflict, Stability and Security Fund), and through other payments and attributions has almost trebled over this period (Figure 1).

Scope of this report

3 This is our fourth report on the UK’s ODA spending. Figure 2 summarises the scope of the first three.

4 This study builds on our other reports on DFID’s and wider government’s management of ODA by focusing on what this spending is achieving in practice. We considered whether:

the allocation of ODA across-government focused sufficiently on effectiveness;

departments’ ODA projects are meeting their planned objectives; and

the centre of government maintains good oversight of the effectiveness of ODA spending.

5 We assess effectiveness by examining the extent to which departments have achieved the outputs and outcomes established at the start of a project. We do so by using evaluative criteria for each of the following:

how ODA-funded programmes are managed;

how progress and performance are assessed; and

how programmes respond to assessments of performance.

6 We also consider how departments assess the impact their portfolio of ODA-funded programmes is having – for example, the extent to which they consider impact at country and thematic level.

7 Our previous reports highlighted a number of challenges departments across government faced in meeting the ODA target. For example, making sure they had sufficient ODA eligible programmes on which to spend the budget. We also noted the support DFID had provided, such as on programme management, to departments which had seen a sudden and considerable increase in their ODA allocations.

8 For this report, we have considered the effectiveness of ODA expenditure in the context of the complex and often dangerous environments in which it is spent. Departments and cross-government funds are looking to implement and secure value for money from ODA-funded programmes while managing multiple challenges  (Figure 3).3

Key findings

Government-wide findings

9 Responsibilities for considering the effectiveness of ODA expenditure are fragmented across government. For example, HM Treasury considers business cases for ODA expenditure, but does not have a role in considering the impact of actual expenditure. Departments are responsible for securing value for money from all their expenditure, including ODA. While a cross-government group of ODA spending departments exists, its focus on the effectiveness of that expenditure is limited (paragraph 1.4, 1.12 and 1.13).

10 Departments and cross-government funds use ODA expenditure to deliver a range of strategies, creating complexities in considering programme performance. The UK Aid Strategy in 2015 set the government’s strategy for spending ODA, establishing four objectives for that expenditure. At the same time the government set three objectives for the National Security Strategy. Alongside these cross-government approaches, country-level and thematic strategies (focusing on, for example, women and girls, migration and on economic development) have been developed. Departments looking to work together overseas are taking steps to bring these strategies together when implementing programmes. But the number of strategies – and their overlap – creates difficulties in terms of reviewing and then reporting performance. This undermines government’s ability to align performance with the objectives set out in strategies and with poverty reduction more broadly. Despite the country and theme focus of these strategies, HM Treasury’s allocation process remains heavily department-focused (paragraphs 1.2 and 1.3 and Figure 4).

11 Shifts in government’s aid priorities have had both a positive and negative impact on progress against objectives in the UK Aid Strategy, illustrated below.

Meeting its ambition to spend ODA across a wider range of departments, DFID’s share of expenditure has declined year on year between 2013 (when the UK met the ODA target for the first time) and 2017.4

The areas on which ODA expenditure has been targeted highlight changing priorities for the UK. For example, bilateral spending on humanitarian interventions increased by more than 15% between 2015 and 2017. It now represents the largest category of expenditure. This is aligned with the Strategy’s objective to “strengthen resilience and response to crises”. Consequently, expenditure on other categories of interventions (such as education) has declined as a proportion of total expenditure.

The UK Aid Strategy made a commitment to increase by 50% by 2020-21 ODA expenditure on support to developing countries to respond to the challenges presented by climate change. Actual expenditure to date in this area is in line with the annual plan agreed as part of the Spending Review in 2015.

The proportion of bilateral ODA expenditure going to countries classified as ‘upper middle income’ has increased both in absolute terms (from £525 million in 2015 to £694 million in 2017) and as a proportion of total ODA expenditure (from 11% to 14%). This is partly a consequence of increased expenditure in countries such as Turkey that have been affected by the Syria crisis. As a result, the proportion of expenditure going to countries at the lower end of the income scale has decreased. Adjusting for the impact of interventions related to Syria shows that the proportion of ODA expenditure going to ‘upper middle income’ countries has remained stable over recent years (Figure 6).

12 Taking ODA expenditure as a whole, government has placed insufficient emphasis on demonstrating its effectiveness and on progress against the UK Aid Strategy. At departmental level, we found evidence that programme performance was monitored and then evaluated when the programme came to an end. But more widely, government has only just started to consider the effectiveness of ODA expenditure across departments and what this says about progress in implementing the UK Aid Strategy. In 2019 departments agreed a framework which sets out, for each of the four objectives in the UK Aid Strategy, ‘indicators of success’ as well as illustrations of the performance achieved. But the framework does not bring these measures together with expenditure, which is necessary to support an assessment of value for money (paragraphs 1.12 and 1.13).

13 Neither DFID nor HM Treasury has assessed whether allocating the ODA budget to departments other than DFID has had the impact intended. ODA-funded programmes generate challenges such as making sure expenditure is eligible to count towards the target and managing programmes in hostile environments. However, government wanted to draw on skills across-government when spending ODA to respond to changes in emphasis in the challenges it faced (such as mass migration and the impact of global warming). It therefore allocated more of the ODA budget to these departments from 2016 onwards. But it did not set out in detail the benefits it expected to achieve from this approach. Nor has it assessed whether its intentions have been delivered in practice (paragraph 1.14).

14 The wider allocation of ODA creates additional risks. For departments other than DFID the changed approach to allocating ODA creates an opportunity to access new funds at a time when many feel their core funding is under great pressure. In the programmes we reviewed we did not find direct evidence of poorer value for money in other departments, but we do think it is important to point out the risks. Depending on each department’s experience of managing ODA expenditure and the relative significance of ODA to its overall budget, departments could feel incentivised to propose spending without challenging its value for money as rigorously, or even in the knowledge that it would be more effective to spend it on other, non-ODA eligible activity. There is a risk departments might also be tempted to seek the ODA funds without a full understanding of whether they have the capability to carry out the work (paragraph 2.3).

15 Departments need to improve the transparency of their ODA expenditure. Government is clear that transparency of ODA expenditure is an important aspect of securing value for money. DFID publishes good-quality information on ODA expenditure across government – for example, how much is spent, by which department and in which country (paragraphs 1.15 to 1.20, and Figures 11 and 12).

We found limitations in departments’ publicly available information. For the seven departments and cross-government funds that accounted for more than 60% of non-DFID ODA expenditure, only two referred to the effectiveness of this spending in their annual report.

Government has recognised more needs to done to meet its ambition that, by 2020, each department should be ranked as either ‘very good’ or ‘good’ against an independent assessment of transparency. Only DFID has met the target. DFID is funding a review of government’s progress towards the target, the results of which will be publicly available in December 2019. This timetable leaves little time to act if DFID’s assessment about the likelihood the target will be achieved is pessimistic.

16 The impact of EU Exit on ODA expenditure remains unclear. The European Union is one of the UK’s key partners for its international development interventions. In 2017, the year for which the most up-to-date information is available, £1.4 billion of the UK’s ODA expenditure – 10% of the total – was through EU institutions. The government has agreed to honour part of this commitment – to the European Development Fund (£443 million in 2017) – until 2020. DFID has stated that it is in the UK’s interest that it continues work with the EU once the UK leaves the EU. What this relationship looks like in practice and the impact it will have on the distribution of the ODA budget and the achievement of the target are currently unclear. DFID told us that it has developed plans for a number of scenarios. Depending on the nature of the UK’s exit from the EU, and given the annual nature of the target, the government may need to redistribute up to £1.4 billion quickly – a situation which would create a risk to value for money (paragraphs 1.22 to 1.27 and Figure 12).

Departmental and country office findings

17 Departments have put in place structures to support target setting and performance assessment. We found that departments representing 86% of overall ODA expenditure had structures in place to support the planning, implementation and monitoring of ODA-funded programmes. For example, programmes were supported by business cases and an explanation as to how intended outcomes might be secured. Departments also produced frameworks setting out milestones against which progress could be assessed. The approach taken by each department was particular to its circumstances, which has an impact on the approach taken to the oversight of performance (illustrated below).

The Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy (BEIS) delegates responsibility for some its ODA expenditure (such as the Global Challenges Research Fund) to implementing partners. Here, it receives regular updates from its partners on a project’s financial position and activities. But this information does not allow BEIS to consider the effectiveness of its expenditure in these areas.

Two of the five British Council projects we reviewed were country projects within wider programmes. For those two projects we saw outcomes set for the whole programme with project level targets for, for example, participants and other outputs rather than impact. In both cases, the British Council had either evaluated the impact of its intervention or was collecting information which would enable it to do so in the future (paragraphs 2.4, 2.5 and Figure 16).

18 Departments’ assessment of effectiveness can be limited, either when setting targets or considering actual performance.

For most of the programmes we reviewed, departments had some measure of progress and performance in place. Good examples of considering effectiveness were evident (such as in the Provincial Health and Nutrition Programme). But it was not always the case that a department’s targets helped it consider a programme’s effectiveness. For example, programmes might establish targets on inputs, activity, and outputs but not for impact. This in part reflects the nature of some of the programmes (such as the Foreign & Commonwealth Office’s expenditure on aid-related front-line diplomacy).

Departments sometimes faced practical difficulties in accessing good-quality information needed to assess performance and the complexity of the environment in which they operated. For example, information might not be readily available from locations that present a high security risk; or from implementing partners that work with different systems and to different standards (paragraphs 2.7 and 2.8, and Figures 17 and 18).

Departments operate in challenging and dangerous environments, which can make the assessment of effectiveness difficult. Moving from the consideration of inputs to the assessment of outcomes and impact can take many years and requires significant expertise.

19 Departments’ responsiveness to reviews of their programmes’ performance was variable. Timely monitoring of performance can help departments to reallocate a programme’s budget either within the programme or into other programmes. Across the 26 programmes we examined we found a mixed picture with respect to departments’ responsiveness to reviews. For example, DFID raised its performance targets for its Provincial Health and Nutrition Programme in Pakistan in response to a review which concluded that they were not sufficiently stretching. But BEIS has only now taken commissioned work to develop performance measures for its Newton Fund, following a review in 2016 which concluded that BEIS should improve its approach to gathering evidence on the outputs and outcomes generated by the Fund (paragraph 2.16 and Figure 19).

20 DFID has a well-developed approach to assessing project progress but overall grades in annual reviews can mask poor results for parts of a project. Each output is assessed and graded separately, but a heavily weighted component of the project can lead to an overall grade that feels out of kilter with overall progress. This might undermine corrective action and skew DFID’s perspective on the performance of its portfolio. DFID is aware of this issue; and our own assessment of project reviews reinforced the concern. Seventeen of the programmes we examined had one or more annual reviews. In 14 reviews, the overall grade awarded exceeded the grade achieved by half or more of the project’s outputs (paragraphs 2.9 to 2.11).

21 We identified some projects that were extended or had their budgets increased without an evaluation of the project’s performance. Evaluations help to support the development of future programmes and were encouraged by all of the departments we looked at as part of this review. We found that, across the 26 projects we reviewed, many had contract extensions or were subsequent phases of particular projects. For some of these the case, for extending the project was made, drawing on evidence of performance. In others, the phases of projects overlapped, without the project’s impact being considered. This approach, which has the merit of maintaining a continuity of provision, means that projects can proceed without a thorough consideration of which areas need to be improved (paragraphs 2.17 to 2.20).

Conclusion on value for money

22 Government’s success in meeting the ODA spending target is clear – it has done so for the last five years. It provides clear reporting on which departments and other bodies are spending the ODA budget and on what types of assistance.

23 However, there is insufficient focus on departments’ capacity to implement programmes and on their effectiveness. Centrally, government makes limited use of performance information generated by departments, inhibiting its ability to make changes to improve effectiveness. Consequently, it still remains unclear whether government is achieving its objectives in the 2015 UK Aid Strategy. Widening ODA expenditure to other departments has increased risks to effectiveness and it is not clear whether the intended benefits of drawing in wider skills have been realised. Government’s desire to demonstrate the value secured from ODA spending is further undermined by its lack of progress improving transparency, a key objective of its own aid strategy.

24 Taking this together, whilst there is good evidence that many programmes within the £14 billion portfolio are securing an impact individually, overall government is not in a position to be confident that the portfolio in its totality is securing value for money.

Recommendations

25 HM Treasury should, as part of the next Spending Review:

develop a systematic approach to assessing departments’ capability and capacity to deliver their plans for ODA expenditure and their plans to consider the effectiveness of that spending; and

consider each department’s and cross-cutting fund’s actual ODA expenditure against the budget agreed as part of the Spending Review 2015, to contribute to its assessment of each department’s capacity to deliver programmes funded in this way.

26 HM Treasury should, when agreeing the framework for assessing progress against the objectives in the UK Aid Strategy, allocate responsibilities for monitoring progress.

27 HM Treasury should develop guidance on how departments and cross-cutting funds might make the impact of their ODA expenditure more transparent as part of, for example, the annual report and accounts process.

28 HM Treasury and DFID should set out the steps they will take, across a range of scenarios, to make sure the UK meets its legal obligation regarding the ODA target in the light of the UK’s decision to leave the European Union.

29 Each department should, depending on the outcome of the DFID-funded review of transparency performance, produce a plan for the actions required to help it meet the target.

30 Departments should:

classify their programmes according to the type of performance measure (such as activities, outputs and outcomes) to which they are best suited; and

then, working together, share information on the approaches they take across these classifications.

1 Provisional figures for 2018 show this proportion has increased to 75%.

2 Provisional figures for 2018 show Department for International Development’s expenditure as £10.9 billion for 2018.

3 Funding for some programmes will be 100% funded by Official Development Assistance (ODA); others are funded by a mix of ODA and non-ODA budget.

4 Provisional data shows a three percentage point increase in Department for International Development’s share of total Official Development Assistance expenditure in 2018 compared with 2017.

Post publication this page was found to contain an error which has been corrected (Please find Published Correction Slip)

Part One

The government-wide perspective

1.1 In this part of the report we look at:

the range of strategies relevant to Official Development Assistance
(ODA) expenditure;

trends in ODA expenditure across government against the UK Aid Strategy;

government’s consideration of the impact of ODA expenditure;

HM Treasury’s approach to allocating the ODA budget; and

government’s approach to improving the transparency of ODA expenditure.

Strategies relevant to ODA expenditure

1.2 The UK government’s work overseas is supported by a broad range of strategies – across government, at departmental level, and focused on themes (examples of which are set out in Figure 4). ODA expenditure is looking to achieve a number and mix of type of objectives. This creates complexities in terms of managing programmes and assessing their performance.

1.3 In the countries we visited, different parts of the UK government were contributing to a range of strategies.

In Turkey, we found that ODA budget was being spent to implement the National Security Council’s country strategy, the National Security Council’s Illegal Migration Strategy, an embassy-wide Single Business Plan, as well as the Department for International Development’s (DFID’s) objectives.

In Pakistan, the various elements of the UK government look to make sure their work is coherent by working to an Integrated Delivery Plan. The plan sets out the shared objectives across the UK government’s interventions.

Allocating ODA budgets

1.4 HM Treasury is responsible for setting each department’s and joint fund’s budget, including the amount that counts as ODA. Budget allocations are informed by ministerial priorities. HM Treasury is also responsible for making changes to these budgets, including ODA budgets. Departments are responsible for managing their expenditure – including ODA – in accordance with HM Treasury’s Managing Public Money guidance.5 And each department’s Accounting Officer is responsible for the proper stewardship of the ODA budget allocated to his or her department.

1.5 In our 2017 report Managing the Official Development Assistance target – a report on progress, we set out HM Treasury’s approach to allocating the ODA budget in the 2015 Spending Review.6 It did so after considering bids from departments – both for ‘rebadged’ existing activities as ODA eligible and for new areas of ODA expenditure. We concluded that HM Treasury had taken an evidence-based approach to allocating ODA budgets to departments. We identified a focus on, for example, programme objectives and the eligibility of expenditure to contribute to the ODA target. We also identified weaknesses in its approach, such as the lack of focus on capability. Figure 5 shows the evidence HM Treasury requested from departments and areas where it did not.

1.6 HM Treasury is planning the Spending Review 2019. It told us that, as part of its preparations, it was considering departments’ performance with regard to ODA expenditure and capability to spend ODA budgets.

1.7 In our 2018 report Improving government’s planning and spending framework, we concluded that government’s approach to business planning did not “…help to break down government silos”.7 We therefore recommended that departments should “demonstrate how they worked with other departments to consider joint bids where objectives are shared”. Objectives for overseas aid, like objectives for other government policies, can cut across multiple departments (see paragraph 1.2). The Committee of Public Accounts concluded it was “frustrated at the Treasury and the Cabinet Office’s lack of action to prevent departments working in silos”.8 HM Treasury told the Committee that, as part of the 2019 Spending Review, joint bids would be a key focus – although it did not elaborate on how it would encourage this. HM Treasury told us that this approach would apply to the allocation of the ODA budget (some of which is allocated to cross-government funds, which have grown in prominence since 2013), but that it was wary of blurring lines of accountability by giving joint responsibility for funding. It also referred to the work of cross-government boards that focus on particular sectors such as health and climate change. These boards could provide insights into effectiveness issues to support decisions at the next Spending Review.

1.8 HM Treasury does not, as part of its approach to allocating ODA budgets to departments, consider the relative value for money of expenditure on an ODA-eligible activity against expenditure on a non-ODA eligible activity. HM Treasury considers that, because of the legislative requirement to meet the ODA target, the position is “fiscally neutral” – that the amount of expenditure required to meet the target is fixed and the choice is therefore to which departments the ODA budget is allocated. As with any ring-fenced expenditure, the fact that it has to meet set criteria to count towards the ODA target limits the options for how departments might spend their budgets, creating a risk to value for money.

Key trends in ODA expenditure

1.9 Since 2013, the first year the UK met the ODA target, the focus of ODA expenditure has changed, which should be viewed against the backdrop of changes in the UK’s aid policy. We considered trends in the UK’s ODA expenditure against the UK Aid Strategy and other priorities. We found performance was mixed (Figure 6).

Assessing the impact of ODA expenditure

1.10 The UK Aid Strategy, published by DFID and HM Treasury in November 2015, has four objectives:

strengthening global peace, security and governance;

strengthening resilience and responding to crises;

promoting global prosperity; and

tackling extreme poverty and helping the world’s most vulnerable.

1.11 In our 2017 report Managing the Official Development Assistance expenditure – an update on progress we highlighted the absence of clarity over which part of government – either individually or working together – was responsible for assessing progress in its implementation.9 We also commented that the Strategy did not, for the four objectives, set measurable targets or specify the outcomes government wished to secure from its successful implementation. At the time we reported neither DFID nor HM Treasury had requested information on programme performance of the outcomes achieved.

1.12 In spring 2019, more than three years after the Strategy was introduced, government has agreed a framework for capturing performance and monitoring progress against the UK Aid Strategy. The framework captures examples of inputs; outputs; activities; and outcomes. But the framework does not bring these measures together with expenditure, which would support an assessment of value for money. The framework also sets out barriers to, for example, making improvements in implementation and reporting. It does not set out the actions a department might take where performance had not been as good as expected.

1.13 HM Treasury will use the framework to monitor ODA expenditure between spending reviews and to respond to requests for information. The framework has been approved by officials on a cross-government group with responsibility for considering ODA-related issues. Subject to ministerial approval, the framework can be used in practice.

1.14 As well as establishing the four objectives set out in paragraph 1.10, the other key objective of the UK Aid Strategy was for departments other than DFID to be responsible for an increasing proportion of ODA expenditure. The rationale for this shift in policy was to draw on departments’ complementary skills, such as the UK’s research and development base. Neither HM Treasury nor DFID completed a detailed assessment of, for example, departments’ capacity to manage additional expenditure or the existence of a pipeline of projects against which to apply the increased budget. The decision resulted in the equivalent of £1.3 billion being spent by other government departments in 2017 than would have been the case if the relative proportions of expenditure had remained static. Neither department has plans to assess the actual impact of the decision.

Improving transparency of ODA expenditure

1.15 Government recognises that transparency of both expenditure and performance is a key element in assessing whether value for money has been secured.

Managing Public Money states that public bodies “should make available timely information about their services, standards, and performance”.10

The UK Aid Strategy states that the government will take steps to make sure “existing ODA and all new ODA spend is and remains good value for money across government taking further steps to [amongst others] introduce greater transparency and deliver tough, independent scrutiny”.11

1.16 Parliament has raised concerns about the transparency of ODA expenditure. In its June 2018 report Definition and administration of ODA, the International Development Committee concluded that government’s decision to “move increasing amounts of ODA outside of DFID […] creates inherent risks in three areas” – including transparency.12,13 The Committee was concerned that departments were not publishing fuller details of their ODA expenditure as this lack of clarity “clouds the public’s ability to see good and bad spending”.

1.17 Some information is publicly available.

DFID publishes, bi-annually, the Statistics on International Development.14 This provides detailed information on ODA expenditure for a calendar year, the basis on which ODA is measured (as well as some historical data). For example, it sets detailed information on how much each department spends, in which countries, and on which areas. The published statistics are based on information provided by departments and cross-government funds.

The Dev Tracker website, hosted by DFID, sets out details of development projects and programmes for which it and other parts of government have responsibility. Information provided includes country, amount of expenditure and reviews of performance.

DFID and HM Treasury publish and update allocations of ODA budgets by department and cross-cutting funds for each year of the 2015 Spending Review period.

1.18 We looked at whether departments other than DFID were making details of their ODA expenditure and its impact available in their key public documents. We found information on the amounts of ODA expenditure was also available in departments’ annual report and accounts (in the case of six out of seven departments and cross-government funds which accounted for more than 60% of non-DFID ODA expenditure – see Figure 10). Despite this, we found that departments made available little additional information on ODA expenditure – such as details of the programmes the budget funded, or the impact or otherwise achieved:

details of ODA expenditure featured in only one department’s Single Departmental Plan; and

three of the seven departments and cross-government funds referred to the effectiveness of their ODA expenditure in their annual report and accounts.

1.19 Outside of these key accountability documents we found some examples of departments making available information on their ODA expenditure.

Departments with expenditure on climate issues bring together background information on their work together with details of the results achieved in their annual report.

The Foreign & Commonwealth Office publishes data on all of its ODA expenditure on a quarterly basis.

The Department of Health & Social Care makes available, through the IATI register, details of its ODA-funded projects, including background details such as projects funded, agents spent against budget and annual reviews.

1.20 As well as establishing the principle behind the transparency of aid expenditure, the UK Aid Strategy set an ambition that all UK government departments that spend the ODA budget will be ranked as ‘good’ or ‘ very good’ on the international Aid Transparency Index by 2020. The Index is an independent assessment of donor transparency. In July 2017, we reported that coverage of UK departments spending ODA by the Index was limited. This remains the case. Figure 11 shows that in 2018, two departments were assessed; and one achieved the standard set out in the UK Aid Strategy.

1.21 Achieving the standard is the responsibility of each department. DFID is funding an assessment of departments’ progress by Publish What You Fund, the charity responsible for the Aid Transparency Index. It plans to publish the findings from this assessment in December 2019. Government departments will therefore have little time to make any improvements necessary to meet the 2020 deadline. Government has recognised that it still has much to do, but considered departments were making good progress. DFID told us that it had encouraged departments to make a plan to reach a ‘good’ or ‘very good’ score. But government has not established milestones against which progress towards the target might be tracked. Nor does government have a plan should Publish What you Fund’s assessment take a pessimistic view of the likelihood of success.

Implications for ODA expenditure of the UK’s decision to leave the EU

1.22 The European Union is one of the DFID’s key partners. In 2017, the UK contributed £1.4 billion of its ODA expenditure – 10% of the total – to the EU (Figure 12). This amount consists of:

£911 million – an attribution to the EU development budget for aid-related activities from the UK’s general contribution to the EU’s overall budget. This funds the Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (DG-ECHO) which focuses on, for example, building resilience and responding to crises, and the Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development (DG-DEVCO) which focuses on, among other things, development policy and aid delivery.

£443 million – a specific contribution to the European Development Fund, which funds activities focused on, for example, economic, social and human development in countries in Africa, the Caribbean and across the Pacific.

1.23 Under the terms of the Withdrawal Agreement, the UK will continue to honour its commitments to the European Development Fund up to 2020, with the consequence that it would continue to pay into this fund up to the mid-2020s. The UK government is clear that it wants to continue to work with the EU development institutions if the UK leaves the EU. It is proposing an approach that would allow for the UK’s participation in the EU development programmes and in its external spending programmes. The government has emphasised that the UK’s continuing participation in the EU’s development initiatives would require what it describes as an appropriate level of influence and oversight over its financial contribution.

1.24 As well as decisions regarding expenditure the government has also made two other commitments:

to provide continuity in duty-free access to the UK market by continuing to offer tariff reductions to around 25 other developing countries; and

[No details are currently available as to what form these initiatives would take practice or their status].

to replicate the EU’s Economic Partnership Agreement, which promotes trade with African, Caribbean and Pacific countries.

[To date, the UK has signed Economic Partnership Agreements with Eastern and Southern Africa (Madagascar, Mauritius, Zimbabwe, and the Seychelles), the Pacific (Fiji and Papua New Guinea) and The Caribbean Forum of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States].15

1.25 DFID told that us that, in summer 2018, it prepared scenarios for future ODA expenditure based on whether the UK leaves the EU with a deal or not. It recently refreshed these. DFID told us that value-for-money considerations were central to its planning and that it was confident that it could find programmes and projects on which to spend the money that is currently routed through the European Union. The scenarios include both bilateral and multilateral alternatives.

1.26 In 2016, DFID assessed the performance of the multilateral organisations it funded. Its review considered issues such as results and value for money, risk and assurance, and transparency and accountability. DFID considered three European Union organisations as part of the review.

1.27 Its results were brought together under two headings – match with UK development objectives and organisational strength. The three European Union organisations were assessed as ‘very good’ and ‘good’ against these criteria.16 As Figure 13 shows only three of the other 36 bodies considered as part of the review achieved a better combination of scores.

5 HM Treasury, Managing Public Money, 12 May 2012, last updated 20 September 2018.

6 Comptroller and Auditor General, Managing the Official Development Assistance target – a report on progress, Session 2017–2019, HC 243, National Audit Office, July 2017.

7 Comptroller and Auditor General, Improving government’s planning and spending framework, Session 2017–2019 HC 1679, National Audit Office, November 2018.

8 HC Committee of Public Accounts, Improving government’s planning and spending framework, Seventy-eighth Report of Session 2017–2019, HC 1596, February 2019.

9 Comptroller and Auditor General, Managing the Official Development Assistance target – a report on progress, Session 2017–2019, HC 243, National Audit Office, July 2017.

10 HM Treasury, Managing Public Money, 14 May 2012, last updated 20 September 2018.

11 Department for International Development and HM Treasury, UK Aid: tackling global challenges in the national interest, Cm 9163, November 2015.

12 The other two areas were coherence and focus on poverty reduction.

13 International Development Committee, Definition and Administration of ODA, Fifth Report of Session 2017–2019, HC 547, June 2018.

14 The Department for International Development publishes UK aid spend for the previous calendar year in Statistics on International Development. It releases provisional spend in the spring and final spend figures in the autumn. This information is designated as a National Statistics publication.

15 Fifteen Caribbean Community states plus the Dominican Republic.

16 Department for International Development used four scores – weak; adequate; good; and very good.

Post publication this page was found to contain an error which has been corrected (Please find Published Correction Slip)

Post publication this page was found to contain an error which has been corrected (Please find Published Correction Slip)

Post publication this page was found to contain an error which has been corrected (Please find Published Correction Slip)

Part Two

Programme and country office findings

2.1 In this part of the report, we look at whether departments:

take a robust approach to portfolio and programme management; and

have assessed the effectiveness of the programmes they manage.

Managing a portfolio of programmes

2.2 Strong country portfolio management is essential to ensure programmes complement each other and maximise overall impact. In 2015, the Independent Commission for Aid Impact (ICAI) reported that “a key success factor [in achieving sustainable impact] is coherence across Department for International Development (DFID) programmes operating in the same space, as well as with initiatives by partner countries and other development partners.” In each of the countries we reviewed, the UK government had taken steps to maintain oversight of the range of programmes managed by different departments and donors. The approaches taken varied in line with the number of departments and type of programmes (see examples below).

Pakistan. The UK Mission has an Integrated Delivery Plan to provide a framework of common objectives for all UK government departments operating in Pakistan. The Mission has thematic boards responsible for overseeing the implementation of those objectives. Despite the portfolio management procedures in place in Pakistan, we saw, in the Consolidating Democracy in Pakistan programme, an example of unforeseen consequences of one programme on another (Figure 14).

China. The UK government spends Official Development Assistance (ODA) through cross-government programmes with different objectives such as the Prosperity Fund (Foreign & Commonwealth Office (FCO)), Newton Fund (Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy (BEIS)) and the Chevening programme (FCO). Each has its own governance structure and projects delivered under these programmes are required to take account of the policies and delivery frameworks set out by the relevant department. As these programmes operate in different sectors, the risk of overlap or duplication is low. However, we noted that there was room for improvement in portfolio management across the Newton Fund in all countries. The mid-term evaluation of this fund identified a need for improved collaboration in the design of research proposals to ensure collaborative as opposed to parallel working. BEIS told us that it has taken action to improve its approach to portfolio management.

Somalia. To prevent overlap or duplication when designing new programmes, DFID has in place country office mechanisms to identify what programmes are being managed by different sector teams within DFID Somalia, by other UK government departments and by other donors (Figure 15).

2.3 The allocation of ODA budgets to departments – and the fact that this money must be spent on eligible activities – can have an impact on their spending decisions. This in turn could have an impact on value for money across the portfolio – both ODA and non-ODA – of a department’s expenditure.

Chevening Scholarships are available to the citizens of 160 countries, not all of which are eligible for ODA expenditure (such as Australia and Japan).17 FCO told us it could see value in funding more scholars in non-eligible countries, but it does not do so because of the need to meet the ODA target.

The Eastern Route Programme is a Conflict, Security and Stability Fund (CSSF)programme, based in Turkey, run by the FCO and Home Office. It is intended to address the objectives in the UK National Security Council’s strategies for Turkey and for irregular migration. With 98% of the programme funded ODA-eligible budget, we were told that activities which might help address the Strategy’s objectives might be passed for consideration by programmes with non ODA funding.

More generally, the CSSF uses a mix of ODA and non-ODA budgets, providing greater flexibility in terms of the types of programmes and projects it can support.

Managing programmes

2.4 HM Treasury and DFID have issued value-for-money guidance for UK ODA expenditure. This sets outs the broad requirements and guiding principles that should inform departments’ processes and decisions (Figure 16).

2.5 We found that all departments we reviewed had in place structures to help them plan, implement and monitor programmes. Their approach varied according to the nature of the programmes they supported, including programme duration, delivery mechanism and accountability arrangements.

DFID expects each programme to have a business case and a performance framework at the outset, and for a programme’s performance to be reviewed annually and evaluated on completion.

BEIS delegates authority, for some of its ODA-funded programmes such as the Global Challenges Research Fund and the Newton Fund, to its delivery partners to select, fund, manage and monitor the performance of individual projects. BEIS meets with its implementing partners to discuss performance and receives quarterly returns from them showing changes in financial profile and setting out activities. But it is not clear how BEIS brings together information on expenditure and performance to help judge value for money.

The British Council requires standard project management documentation for all projects while recognising that the amount of detail should be proportionate to the size of the project. In line with this approach, for the two country specific projects we reviewed which were part of wider programmes, we saw programme documentation which set out outcomes for the programme as a whole. At a project level, both set targets for outputs such as attendance at events and developing links with other organisations, but not for impact. For one of these projects, the British Council had completed evaluations which considered, amongst other things, impact. For the other, as this was at an early stage, it had started to collect information which could be used to establish baselines against which impact for similar initiatives in the future might be measured.

Monitoring and reviewing performance

2.6 DFID and HM Treasury’s guidance for departments spending ODA states that they should establish results frameworks at the programme’s design phase. The guidance states that departments should then monitor results over the project, and that strong results frameworks should track programme inputs and activities; outputs; outcomes; and longer-term impacts. Each part of the results chain should be measured using clearly defined indicators, with baselines, milestones and realistic targets and with a timeframe for monitoring and assessment.

2.7 Figure 17 sets out the challenges departments face in assessing the performance of their ODA-funded programmes, against good practice, illustrated with examples from our review of 26 programmes.18

2.8 The focus of the results frameworks in the programmes we reviewed varied. They ranged from simple input or output measures at the most basic level, through to comprehensive performance frameworks that measure inputs, outputs, outcomes and impacts, with annual milestones (Figure 18). Of the four departments we reviewed, DFID had the most detailed results frameworks for programmes and the most consistent approach to regular assessment through its annual review process. Given that DFID spent 72% of total ODA in 2017 and has a much longer history of delivering development programmes, this is unsurprising.

2.9 As part of its ongoing approach to monitoring performance, DFID requires all programmes to have annual reviews. These consider progress on outputs, outcomes, the theory of change and value for money of the programme. Review teams are largely made up of members of the programme team. There are three key stages to the process.

Review teams assess and rate each programme output using a five-point rating scale from ‘C’ (outputs fail to meet expectations) through to ‘A++’ (outputs substantially exceed expectations).

An overall output score is calculated automatically, taking account of each output’s weighting and rating (which is converted into a numerical score). This score is converted back into an overall rating for the programme.

DFID monitors the results of annual reviews through a Portfolio Quality Index (PQI) score, which amalgamates all annual review scores for the previous 12 months. Between April 2017 and December 2018, 88% of programmes reviewed scored A or above (they met or exceeded expectations).

2.10 DFID is continually looking to improve its review process. Its most recent internal assessment of annual reviews in 2017 concluded that they were well established and valued as both an approach to oversight of performance and as a way to identify lessons for improvement across the organisation. It also identified some weaknesses around scoring, and concluded that:

programme teams felt a need to achieve certain scores for the PQI score to avoid programmes coming under pressure to be closed; and

there was a conflict between being open and honest about programme performance (including lessons learned and having the annual review published).

The assessment recommended that over the life of each programme, there should be some level of independence from the programme team in producing annual reviews. In response, DFID changed the guidance and templates for the annual review and the results framework and communicated these changes to programme teams.

2.11 DFID’s guidance for scoring annual reviews acknowledges that a heavily weighted indicator score can lead to an overall score that may feel at odds with overall progress. Our analysis of the scores for 43 annual reviews across 17 programmes showed that some of DFID’s programmes scored well in annual reviews despite poor performance against individual outputs.19 Seven of 17 programmes we reviewed had at least one annual review in the past six years in which the programme’s overall annual review grade exceeded the grades achieved by half or more of the programme’s individual outputs. The overall grade may not fairly reflect actual performance and may therefore be misleading.

2.12 We also found it hard to track performance on some programmes because of frequent changes to targets across the life of the programme. DFID is aware of this issue as it has been raised in four reports in the past three years. For example, in 2017 DFID’s internal report on its annual reviews found that 80% of results frameworks in the sampled annual reviews had changed in some way during the annual review period; and in 2018, a report by ICAI found that output targets had been reduced in 22 out of 24 programmes reviewed for its report on programme and portfolio management.20

2.13 ICAI found that DFID often sets ambitious targets for programmes at the design phase, only to revise them downwards in light of experience. While recognising that programme log frames (monitoring frameworks) are not meant to be static and adjustments are to be expected, ICAI concluded that the flexibility of targets made it difficult to assess whether a positive annual review reflected good programme performance or a lack of ambition in the targets. DFID responded by strengthening its guidance on writing annual reviews and requiring changes to log frames to be recorded.

2.14 The 2015 Aid Strategy states that project performance of all ODA projects must be regularly assessed and that poor performing programmes should be closed and their funds redeployed. Timely monitoring allows departments to reallocate money to more effective elements of programmes during the programme’s lifetime. In February 2018, ICAI concluded that DFID had improved its identification of underperforming programmes and then responding with remedial action (such as closing programmes and reallocating resources).

2.15 We saw evidence of resources being reallocated in some DFID programmes.

The team responsible for the Punjab Education Support Programme Phase II reallocated £9 million from a component designed to improve access to finance for low-fee private schools (which was not performing well) to two new components to improve education outcomes for girls in low-performing districts of Punjab.

The team responsible for the Provincial Health and Nutrition Programme in Pakistan reduced the amount available to provincial governments by £11.5 million when performance measures were missed. It reallocated the funds to meet emerging priorities, such as integrated disease surveillance and response.

2.16 Our review of 26 programmes identified examples of teams making positive changes to their programmes in the light of reviews; however, we also found examples where teams were slow to respond and allowed poorly performing activities to continue (Figure 19).

Evaluating performance and extending programmes

2.17 DFID’s and HM Treasury’s value-for-money guidance for UK ODA expenditure states that programme evaluation provides valuable information on the efficiency, effectiveness and sustainability of interventions. This information can be used to inform the development of future programmes as well as support the delivery of current programmes.

2.18 In the programmes we reviewed we found varied practice in the extent to which departments used evaluation to inform contract extensions, recognising that departments need to balance continuity of provision against merits of learning lessons. In some cases, a business case addendum had been submitted, making a clear case for the extension with reference to supporting evidence. For others, programme phases overlapped so that the second phase started before the first phase had been fully evaluated (Figure 20).

2.19 Given the lengthy business case and procurement processes required for commissioning large programmes, DFID’s guidance for contract amendments (including extensions) requires the submission of amendment applications at least 12 months before a contract ends. Teams should provide evidence of good performance and continuing value for money in their submissions. DFID told us that annual and mid-term reviews provide valuable evidence for this purpose. Teams used recommendations from these reports to inform future business cases and contract extension applications.

2.20 In its review of DFID’s tendering and contract management, ICAI found that contracts were frequently amended beyond their planned budget or duration owing to inappropriate contracting choice.21 This can be costly and disruptive. It also found that difficult and complex programmes frequently had inception periods that are too short. While short inception periods may occasionally be suitable, these should be based on programme need. DFID responded by running a series of workshops to improve programme teams’ contract management skills and by extending the inception phase of programmes to get the design right at the beginning, to avoid problems with implementation.

17 Funded by the Foreign & Commonwealth Office and partner organisations, Chevening offers two types of award – Chevening Scholarships and Chevening Fellowships. The recipients of which are selected by British embassies and high commissions.

18 HM Treasury, Cabinet Office, National Audit Office, Audit Commission, Office for National Statistics, Choosing the Right FABRIC – A Framework for Performance Information, 2003.

19 Seventeen of the 26 programmes we examined had one or more annual review.

20 Independent Commission for Aid Impact, DFID’s approach to value for money in programme and portfolio management – a performance review, February 2018.

21 Independent Commission for Aid Impact, Achieving value for money through procurement, Part 2: DFID’s approach to value for money through tendering and contract management – a performance review, September 2018.

Post publication this page was found to contain an error which has been corrected (Please find Published Correction Slip)

Appendix One

Our audit approach

1 We have, to date, produced three reports on Official Development Assistance (ODA). This report builds on our previous work to consider the effectiveness of ODA expenditure. To do this we examined whether:

the allocation of ODA focuses sufficiently on effectiveness;

departments’ ODA projects are meeting their planned objectives; and

the centre of government maintains good oversight of the effectiveness of ODA spending.

2 Our audit approach is summarised in Figure 21.

Appendix Two

Our evidence base

1 We have reached our independent conclusion on the effectiveness of government’s Official Development Assistance (ODA) spending by analysing evidence collected between October 2018 and April 2019. Our approach is outlined in Appendix One.

2 In designing and carrying out our work, we took account of previous National Audit Office reports on ODA (see paragraph 1 of Appendix One).

3 We interviewed staff from the Department for International Development, the Foreign & Commonwealth Office, the Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy, the Joint Funds Unit and HM Treasury:

In departments and bodies with responsibilities for the management of ODA funded programmes and projects we covered issues such as background to particular projects and programmes and the approach taken to their oversight (from setting targets to monitoring and then reporting performance).

At HM Treasury we covered issues such as its approach to the allocation of ODA budgets.

4 We reviewed key documents, including the following:

The 2015 Spending Review.

Departments’ annual reports and accounts and Single Departmental Plans.

Business cases, performance reviews and evaluations related to particular projects and programmes.

Guidance on programme and project management – both department specific and cross-government.

5 We reviewed 26 programmes funded by ODA – six in Pakistan, and five in each of Turkey, Somalia, Uganda and China. The countries were selected against criteria such as amounts of ODA expenditure, the focus of UK government involvement and the range of UK bodies managing programmes and projects in each country.

For each project we considered the approach taken to, for example, setting objectives, monitoring performance and assessing impact, and reporting performance.

We completed visits to Pakistan and Turkey. We interviewed UK government officials responsible for management of the UK work in each country as well as teams with responsibility for management of individual projects and programmes. We also interviewed, for some of the projects and programmes, implementing partners and beneficiaries.

6 We analysed the Statistics on International Development (covering each year from 2013 to 2018) to understand changes in ODA expenditure over time, by department and by sector.

7 We completed a desk-based literature review, to help build our understanding of ODA expenditure. The review looked at issues including the benefits and unintended outcomes associated with the ODA target and the challenges in measuring the effectiveness of ODA expenditure.

8 We consulted with donor organisations (public sector bodies equivalent to the Department for International Development) in other countries to get their perspectives on ODA expenditure. The consultation focused on understanding, for example, how ODA was managed in different countries and the challenges in measuring the effectiveness of the ODA expenditure.

We received responses from Canada, Denmark, Germany, Norway and the Netherlands.

Appendix Three

Details of the programmes we reviewed

The programmes we looked at

1 In Pakistan we reviewed six programmes including three managed by the Department for International Development (DFID), two managed by the British Council and one managed by the Conflict, Stability and Security Fund (CSSF) (Figure 22).

2 In Somalia we reviewed three programmes managed by DFID and two CSSF programmes (Figure 23).

3 In Uganda we reviewed five programmes managed by DFID (Figure 24).

4 In Turkey we reviewed five programmes managed by a range of departments and cross-government funds (Figure 25).

5 In China we reviewed five programmes including one managed by the Foreign & Commonwealth Office, two managed by the Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy, and two managed by the British Council (Figure 26).

Appendix Four

Country case studies

1 This appendix summarises some details on each of the five countries we examined as case studies for our report. The analysis is based on ODA that can be attributed to a recipient country.

Pakistan

Background to UK aid in Pakistan

2 The UK government has identified that helping to ensure a prosperous and stable Pakistan is critical for the future of millions of poor Pakistanis, and the stability and security of both the region and the UK.

3 Almost one-third of Pakistan’s population lives in poverty (more than 60 million people), with women most seriously affected. 22.6 million children do not go to school and half of the population, including two-thirds of women, cannot read or write. One in 11 children die before their fifth birthday, every year 9,700 women die in childbirth and 44% of children under five are stunted. Pakistan’s population is set to grow by 40 million people in the next 15 years and the economy needs to grow by more than 7% a year to create jobs for this growing young population.

4 There is major inequality based on geography, gender, ethnicity, disability and faith and a significant modern slavery problem among the poor, minorities, women and children. Pakistan carries a high risk of natural disasters; it has the second highest number of refugees in the world and continues to suffer from extremism and militancy. Consolidating the growing democracy and capacity of government institutions remains essential.

5 Figure 27 sets out some key facts about Official Development Assistance (ODA) expenditure in Pakistan.

Somalia

Background to UK aid in Somalia

6 Somalia is one of the world’s poorest and most fragile states and one of the most challenging operating environments in which the UK works. Improving security is a priority, including managing the threat that terrorism poses to Somalia, the region and potentially further afield.

7 It sits at the bottom of most development league tables, with widespread poverty and inequality, very low human development indicators, endemic violence and discrimination against women and girls, a persistent humanitarian crisis, and a weak economy. Four out of five Somalis live below the national poverty line, and more than one in 10 of Somalia’s 12 million people are now internally displaced as a result of conflict and humanitarian crisis. State capability and financial governance are weak, and corruption is a concern. Environmental conditions in many parts of Somalia are extreme and the effects of climate shocks add significantly to the risks to lives and livelihoods.

8 Figure 28 sets out some key facts about ODA expenditure in Somalia.

Uganda

Background to UK aid in Uganda

9 Uganda’s influence and relative stability in the region makes it a priority country for UK objectives. Despite reducing national poverty rates over the past decade, Uganda remains very poor and inequality is growing. 63% of Uganda’s 35 million people are either poor or at risk of falling back into poverty due to dependence on subsistence agriculture. Half the population is under 15 years old (the world average is 27%) and women have on average 5.4 children.

10 High population growth rates have a negative impact on economic growth and create challenges for education and health services. More than 700,000 young people enter the labour market each year with few job opportunities.

11 Uganda hosts more than one million refugees, predominately from South Sudan, and is the third largest refugee hosting nation in the world. This number is expected to continue to increase. Refugees are unlikely to return home in the near future because of conflict and political instability.

12 The UK looks to help Uganda overcome the challenges of growing inequality and slowing growth rates through international efforts to boost business opportunities by creating jobs and increasing investment in regional trade. The Department for International Development (DFID) works with the Foreign & Commonwealth Office, Ministry of Defence, Department for International Trade, UK Export Finance and British Council to achieve the UK’s objectives in Uganda.

13 Figure 29 sets out some key facts about ODA expenditure in Uganda.

Turkey

Background to UK aid in Turkey

14 Turkey hosts the highest number of refugees in the world including 3.6 million Syrians. The UK supports the European Union (EU) Turkey Joint Action Plan in which Turkey agreed to work with the EU to continue helping Syrian refugees and to take further steps to prevent irregular migration to the EU.

15 DFID provides refugees and Turkish host communities with services and support to assist Turkey in absorbing the burden of such a large number of refugees and looks to create the conditions that mean refugees are less likely to fall prey to people smugglers and attempt the perilous journey to Europe. DFID’s support to the Facility for Refugees in Turkey, as part of the EU Turkey Joint Action Plan, has contributed to a reduction of irregular migrants to the EU from more than 200,000 in October 2015 to 4,000 in the same month of 2017.

16 Figure 30 sets out some key facts about ODA expenditure in Turkey.

China

Background to UK aid in China

17 China is the largest and fastest-growing emerging economy in the world and provides substantial aid, trade and investment to the developing world. Following the closure of the UK’s bilateral aid programme in China in 2011, the UK and China established a new Global Development Partnership in 2011. Through this partnership, DFID is working with China to develop a range of programmes in key sectors including agriculture and food security, disaster risk reduction, global health, trade, and investment.

18 Although DFID does not have an ODA aid programme in China, ODA is spent in China through cross-government programmes such as the Newton Fund (funded by the Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy), the Prosperity Fund (funded by the Joint Funds Unit) and the Chevening programme (funded by the Foreign & Commonwealth Office).

19 Figure 31 sets out some key facts about ODA expenditure in China.

Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General

The effectiveness of
Official Development Assistance expenditure

HC 2218 Session 2017–2019

ISBN 9781786042729

Ordered by the House of Commons to be printed on 19 June 2019

CORRECTION

In paragraph 16 on page 12:
The third sentence currently reads “In 2017, the year for which the most up-to-date information is available, £1.3 billion of the UK’s ODA expenditure – 9% of the total – was through EU institutions.” This needs to be corrected to say “In 2017, the year for which the most up-to-date information is available, £1.4 billion of the UK’s ODA expenditure – 10% of the total – was through EU institutions”.

The final sentence currently reads “Depending on the nature of the UK’s exit from the EU, and given the annual nature of the target, the government may need to redistribute up to £1.4 billion quickly – a situation which would create a risk to value for money (paragraphs 1.21 to 1.26 and Figure 13). This needs to be corrected to say “Depending on the nature of the UK’s exit from the EU, and given the annual nature of the target, the government may need to redistribute up to £1.4 billion quickly – a situation which would create a risk to value for money (paragraphs 1.22 to 1.27 and Figure 12).

The revised paragraph should read:

16 The impact of EU Exit on ODA expenditure remains unclear. The European Union is one of the UK’s key partners for its international development interventions. In 2017, the year for which the most up-to-date information is available, £1.4 billion of the UK’s ODA expenditure – 10% of the total – was through EU institutions. The government has agreed to honour part of this commitment – to the European Development Fund (£443 million in 2017) – until 2020. DFID has stated that it is in the UK’s interest that it continues work with the EU once the UK leaves the EU. What this relationship looks like in practice and the impact it will have on the distribution of the ODA budget and the achievement of the target are currently unclear. DFID told us that it has developed plans for a number of scenarios. Depending on the nature of the UK’s exit from the EU, and given the annual nature of the target, the government may need to redistribute up to £1.4 billion quickly – a situation which would create a risk to value for money (paragraphs 1.22 to 1.27 and Figure 12).

In paragraph 1.18, second bullet on page 28:
The second bullet currently reads “only two of the seven departments and cross-government funds referred to the effectiveness of their ODA expenditure in their annual report and accounts”. This needs to be corrected to say “three of the seven departments and cross-government funds referred to the effectiveness of their ODA expenditure in their annual report and accounts”

The revised paragraph should read:

1.18 We looked at whether departments other than DFID were making details of their ODA expenditure and its impact available in their key public documents. We found information on the amounts of ODA expenditure was also available in departments’ annual report and accounts (in the case of six out of seven departments and cross-government funds which accounted for more than 60% of non-DFID ODA expenditure – see Figure 10). Despite this, we found that departments made available little additional information on ODA expenditure – such as details of the programmes the budget funded, or the impact or otherwise achieved:

details of ODA expenditure featured in only one department’s Single Departmental Plan; and

three of the seven departments and cross-government funds referred to the effectiveness of their ODA expenditure in their annual report and accounts.

In paragraph 1.22 on page 30:
The second sentence currently reads “In 2017, the UK contributed £1.3 billion of its ODA expenditure – 11% of the total – to the EU (Figure 12 on page 32).” This needs to be corrected to say “In 2017, the UK contributed £1.4 billion of its ODA expenditure – 10% of the total – to the EU (Figure 12).”

The revised paragraph should read:

1.22 The European Union is one of the DFID’s key partners. In 2017, the UK contributed £1.4 billion of its ODA expenditure – 10% of the total – to the EU (Figure 12). This amount consists of:

£911 million – an attribution to the EU development budget for aid-related activities from the UK’s general contribution to the EU’s overall budget. This funds the Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (DG-ECHO) which focuses on, for example, building resilience and responding to crises, and the Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development (DGDEVCO) which focuses on, among other things, development policy and aid delivery.

£443 million – a specific contribution to the European Development Fund, which funds activities focused on, for example, economic, social and human development in countries in Africa, the Caribbean and across the Pacific.

BACK

Post publication this page was found to contain an error which has been corrected (Please find Published Correction Slip)

BACK

BACK

In Figure 12:
The figure records £495 million against European Development Fund for 2017. This needs to be corrected to £443 million.

The revised figure is as follows:

BACK

In Figure 17, the following correction is needed :
Under the Examples column, the sentence ‘The Consolidating Democracy in Pakistan programme team took a similar approach, attributing 20% of the impact – the additional number of voters – to its funding in line with the UK’s 20% of total programme funding.’ needs to be deleted

The revised figure is as follows:

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