Background to the report

For more than four decades, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) has run two major programmes through which it manages the supply of military equipment and associated support services on behalf of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA):

Jump to downloads
  • the Ministry of Defence Saudi Armed Forces Projects (MODSAP), which began in 1986 as the Al Yamamah programme. Through MODSAP, the prime contractor, BAE Systems Plc (BAE), supplies military aircraft, naval vessels, weapons, training and associated support services to the Saudi Armed Forces. The main MODSAP programmes run on five-year cycles, and the current ones began in 2022.
  • the Saudi Arabia National Guard Communications Project (SANGCOM), which started in 1978. SANGCOM delivers telecommunications capability for the Saudi Arabian National Guard (the National Guard). The current work programme runs from January 2020 until September 2025.

In 2012, the Serious Fraud Office (SFO) began investigating the prime contractor for SANGCOM, GPT Special Project Management Ltd (GPT), about alleged irregular payments from GPT to a subcontractor made between 2007 and 2012. The SFO investigation and subsequent prosecution resulted in two outcomes:

  • in April 2021, GPT accepted its guilt in respect of one offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act 1906.
  • in March 2024, two senior staff (a former managing director at GPT and a former part-owner of the subcontractor) were acquitted of one count of corruption, although one was convicted of a separate offence.

This court case related to SANGCOM, and the SFO made no allegations regarding MODSAP.

During the court case, the defence raised questions about the MoD’s knowledge and involvement in the payments made to the subcontractor which led to the prosecutions. In April 2021, the judge imposing GPT’s fine expressly reduced it on the basis that he was satisfied that the UK government was “substantially involved in the historic corrupt arrangements which led to GPT’s offending conduct”.

Scope of the report

In response to the interest generated by the conclusion of the court case, this investigation brings transparency to the MoD’s current arrangements and activities for managing the MODSAP and SANGCOM programmes. It examines:

  • the arrangements the MoD has agreed with the KSA government to manage programmes on its behalf
  • the controls and processes the MoD operates to manage the programmes it runs through these government-to-government agreements
  • the controls and processes the MoD has for making payments under these programmes
  • the arrangements the MoD has in place to ensure that the controls and processes are working as intended

The investigation does not examine previous arrangements, including those in place during the period covered by the SFO investigation, which have been superseded. It does, however, consider the extent to which the MoD has applied lessons learned from issues raised during the court case. The investigation does not evaluate the value for money of the arrangements, because they are fully funded by the KSA government.

Concluding remarks

The NAO undertook this investigation to bring transparency to the current arrangements relating to the MoD’s management of contracts on behalf of the KSA. The investigation finds that the MoD has a clear set of controls to manage and oversee expenditure relating to the contracts it manages on behalf of the KSA and that its actions are currently compliant with those controls.

It has sought to learn lessons from the court case with which it has been involved and has strengthened its processes. The NAO has identified no significant areas of concern.

Downloads

Publication details

Press release

View press release (10 Sep 2025)

Latest reports